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Contemporary Russia has shown an increasing preference for using Cold War–era 
political warfare techniques, which are deeply rooted in its doctrine and foreign policies. 
To date, the U.S. response comprises the conventional military aspects of the Cold War–
era deterrence and containment rather than political warfare strategies. Exploring 
previous U.S. experience in political warfare activities—under the broad categories of 
strategic influence, support to political, social, and counter-government groups, and 
special warfare—provides insight into determining a contemporary political warfare 
strategy. This thesis tests three hypotheses regarding U.S. political warfare experience 
during the Cold War. The exploration of these hypotheses shows that a strategic influence 
narrative centered on a “full and fair” strategy may produce better results rather than one 
centered on delegitimizing the enemy. Additionally, it was found that the United States 
should continue to support political, social, and counter-government groups, but should 
also take into consideration the type of support being provided while ensuring the group 
already has certain characteristics and enjoys public support. Finally, Cold War 
experience indicates that special warfare has the capacity to support and synchronize 
interagency political warfare activities. This analysis illuminates a path forward for a 
comprehensive political warfare policy to counter a reinvigorated Russian political 
warfare strategy.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, despite a supposed 
restructuring away from Soviet-era policies and systems of political warfare, Russia has 
shown an increasing preference to return to them. In the Baltics, Russia has continued to 
intervene in political matters and use propaganda to maintain its influence in the region. In 
2008, the Russian intervention in Georgia included the use of proxy organizations, 
psychological operations, and cyber warfare. The result was a political agreement 
cementing a Russian role in the Georgia–Russian border region. Russian actions in 
Ukraine in 2014 were only a culminating event for the political warfare actions Russia had 
taken in the country over the last decade. The Ukraine intervention also represents the 
implementation of Russian doctrine and policy emphasizing the role of non-military 
means to achieve strategic objectives, a hallmark of political warfare.  
Even though Russia has been using political warfare as a means of influence, the 
United States has responded with what could be described as a strategy straight from the 
annals of military-centric deterrence. In 2014, the U.S. military began Operation Atlantic 
Resolve (OAR), a multi-year series of conventional military exercises, training events, and 
unit rotations in Europe. It was designed to show military strength and capability as well 
as an assurance of U.S. commitment to collective security and stability in the region. To 
expand OAR, in 2015, the White House proposed the European Reassurance Initiative 
(ERI), a temporary investment into security assurance programs for U.S. allies in Eastern 
Europe.1 In 2016, the ERI budget quadrupled to $3.4 billion and turned away from the 
objective of assurance to the objective of deterrence.2 The U.S. strategy to counter Russian 
political warfare in the post–Cold War era has shown a preference for military-centric 
deterrence.  
                                                 
1 Shannon Dick, “Assurance and Deterrence in Europe—A Cold War Redux,” Georgetown Security 
Studies Review, March 11, 2016, http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2016/03/11/assurance-and-
deterrence-in-europe-a-cold-war-redux/.  




Russia’s actions appear to be based on 40 years of Cold War political warfare 
experience; the United States should be equipped to combat a strategy reminiscent of that 
era. Russian political warfare doctrine of the 21st century has its roots in Soviet history. 
The United States has its own history of political warfare in the Cold War, yet its reaction 
to Russian political warfare is focused on conventional means to deter and contain further 
Russian actions. The United States should respond with a balanced policy that uses all 
instruments of national power. This would require looking back to its Cold War policy, 
which includes political warfare activities in addition to a conventional military show of 
capability and strength to inform a contemporary policy.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION  
As of 2016, U.S. policy and actions have not reflected the use of all instruments of 
national power in a cohesive, synchronized strategy to counter Russia’s political warfare. 
U.S. deterrence and containment policies during the Cold War included displays of 
conventional military and nuclear strength as well as political warfare activities. Exploring 
the U.S. Cold War political warfare activities could inform current U.S. policy toward a 
Russia that is using non-military means to achieve its objectives. The research question is 
as follows: 
What combination of programs, concepts, and tools from Cold War 
political warfare-based activities and policies best advances U.S. strategy to 
counter Russian political warfare in the 21st century?  
U.S. Cold War policies spanned almost 40 years, informing multiple 
administrations’ strategies to deter, contain, and rollback Soviet expansion and influence. 
Russian actions and doctrine in the late 1990s and early 2000s re-emphasized political 
warfare, particularly its use of non-military organizations to engage and influence former 
Soviet societies and governments. Exploring U.S. Cold War history, aside from a 
conventional military or nuclear build-up, may provide insight into the programs, 
concepts, and tools the United States could implement in the 21st century.  
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B. BACKGROUND 
U.S. Cold War policies of deterrence and containment had their roots in the 
writings and publications of former U.S. Department of State (DoS) Foreign Service 
officer, George Kennan. Kennan’s policy options were focused on the concept of political 
warfare, which he describes as follows: 
Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time 
of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all 
the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national 
objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from 
such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures and ‘white’ 
propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of ‘friendly’ 
foreign elements, ‘black’ psychological warfare and even encouragement 
of underground resistance in hostile states.3 
The tools and activities of political warfare noted by Kennan evolved into overt 
and covert activities that include unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense 
(FID), psychological operations, public affairs, security sector assistance, political action, 
democracy assistance, and a host of other programs. For this thesis, these activities are 
arranged into three categories: strategic influence; support to social, political, and counter-
government groups; and special warfare.  
The aforementioned activities emphasize the use of all instruments of national 
power in political warfare to engage, influence, persuade, and possibly coerce a population 
or government to achieve a specific policy objective, such as deterrence and containment.4 
For example, U.S. support to Bolivian security forces combatting Che Guevara’s rebels 
used foreign internal defense as a form of government engagement. Special warfare, 
executed by special operations forces, also makes up many of the activities in political 
warfare and in military doctrine is a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions executed 
in permissive, uncertain, or hostile environments. Influence and information activities, 
called strategic influence in this thesis, include psychological operations, propaganda, 
                                                 
3 Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Policy Planning Staff Memorandum,” May 4, 1948, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d269.  
4 Charles T. Cleveland et al., “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” Joint Force Quarterly 80, 
no. 1 (2016): 102, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/643108/unconventional-
warfare-in-the-gray-zone/.  
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radio messaging, and cultural exchanges as a means to influence and persuade a target 
population. As researcher Fred Iklé noted, simply incorporating political warfare into 
policies is not enough; the success depends on “planned, integrated, and coherent use of 
the tools of political warfare.”5 Planned and integrated political warfare policies executed 
in the Cold War both by the Soviets and the United States can serve as a backdrop for the 
contemporary tensions between the United States and Russia today. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
U.S. Cold War policies reflected the objectives of deterring, containing, and rolling 
back Soviet expansion around the world. In 1947, George Kennan published an article 
entitled “Sources of Soviet Conduct” in Foreign Affairs, which introduced the concept of 
containment and political warfare to the American public. The Truman administration and 
the National Security Council (NSC) took notice of Kennan’s official writings on the 
subject. The next 40 years of deterrence and containment policies outlined in NSC 
directives, such as NSC-4A, NSC 10/2, and NSC-68, can arguably be traced to Kennan’s 
influence on the administration.6 From the outset, the policies included not only basic 
deterrence principles of conventional military means but also political warfare activities as 
outlined by Kennan. Nevertheless, in the decades since the fall of the Soviet Union, 
research on the deterrence and containment principles from the Cold War has focused on 
conventional military and nuclear means of executing those policies rather than on 
political warfare and non-military means. It could be argued though that political warfare 
and non-military means are necessary complements to conventional deterrence and 
containment strategies to meet national objectives.7  
Deterrence is inherently about threats and credibility through force. Paul Huth, a 
leading scholar in international relations, defines deterrence as  
                                                 
5 Fred Iklé, “The Modern Context” in Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the 
U.S. Approach, ed. Carnes Lord and Frank R. Barnett (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 
1989), 6.  
6 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 52.  
7 Robert Teague, “Containment: Relevant or Relic?” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and 
General Staff College, 2011), 2.  
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The use of threats by one party to convince another party to refrain from 
initiating some course of action. Threats serve as a deterrent to the extent 
that it convinces its target not to carry out the intended action because of 
the costs and losses the target would incur.8  
For military-based methods of deterrence, the deterring state needs actual military capacity 
to respond quickly, and with strength, in the event deterrence fails. Without the capability 
and strength, a deterring state would not be able to deny the attacking state its military 
objectives once the armed offensive commenced.9 During the Cold War, when the United 
State increased its military capacity and strength, it legitimized deterrence threats to 
Russia while also providing “teeth” behind the other instruments of national power.  
As first proposed by George Kennan, containment strategy was aimed at the 
psychological aspects of influence, exploitation and vulnerabilities.10 While Kennan never 
discounted the role of the military, he stressed that if a threat is not entirely military 
centric, then a military focused strategy should not be the solution.11 Acknowledging that 
the Soviet threat was not purely military-focused, U.S. Cold War actions reflected the 
combination of military and political warfare activities. Nevertheless, Cold War deterrence 
and containment research is often viewed historically by the actions of each administration 
and through the lens of conventional military action. M. Elaine Bunn, writing on the 
concept of tailored deterrence, and Davis, McNerney, and Oliker, writing on extended 
containment, each attempt to expand and emphasize the non-military aspects of deterrence 
and containment policies, but the basics of these ideas are still focused on the conventional 
military role.12 
Since the 2008 Russian intervention in Georgia, there has been an increase in calls 
for policies and strategies similar to Cold War containment and deterrence to counter 
                                                 
8 Paul Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” 
Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999): 25–48.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 39. 
11 Ibid., 42.  
12 Lynn Davis, Olga Oliker, and Michael McNerney, NATO Needs a Comprehensive Strategy for 
Russia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2015), 14; M. Elaine Bunn, “Can 
Deterrence Be Tailored?,” Strategic Forum no. 225 (January 2007): 2, http://cyberanalysis.pbworks.com/
f/SF225.pdf.  
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Russia’s reenergized political warfare. The resilience and engagement strategy proposed 
by the RAND Corporation hints at a policy that uses all instruments of national power to 
build a country’s resiliency and independence, so that the defending country is not 
vulnerable to Russian pressures.13 In a July 2015 editorial on the blog War on the Rocks, 
Mark Galeotti of New York University called for a “hybrid defense plan.” Galeotti 
proposes that the use of all instruments of national power should be a part of a 
“comprehensive national security strategy, target hardening against [the] hybrid warfare” 
tactics of Russia.14 In addition, Galeotti also proposes, “The most powerful defenses 
against Russian mischief-making and manipulation are, social cohesion, effective law 
enforcement, an independent and responsible media, and legitimate, transparent and 
efficient governance.”15 The idea of stabilizing a nation as a method to counter Russian 
political warfare is similar to previous U.S. Cold War containment practices such as the 
Marshall Plan and other democracy assistance programs.  
The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) published a 
counter-unconventional warfare white paper calling for a whole-of-government approach 
to counter political warfare as seen by Russia, Iran, and China.16 This paper, and others 
like it, calls for policies that position a nation state “to attrite and defeat those insurgent, 
separatist, and terrorist movements which rely on external support” to counter Russia’s 
political warfare activities. In October 2015, Gregory Feifer of Foreign Policy magazine 
proclaimed that Russia’s actions demand “a new overarching strategy to limit Putin’s 
influence in a measured way. It should be modeled on what Kennan proposed almost 
seven decades ago.”17 Academics, military leaders, and researchers are all recognizing 
that United States policy to counter Russian aggression should incorporate other 
instruments of national power besides traditional military deterrence.  
                                                 
13 Davis, Oliker, and McNerney, NATO Needs a Comprehensive Strategy, 14.  
14 Mark Galeotti, “Time to Think about Hybrid Defense,” War on the Rocks [blog], July 30, 2015, 
http://warontherocks.com/2015/07/time-to-think-about-hybrid-defense/.  
15 Ibid. 
16 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Counter Unconventional Warfare (Ft. Bragg, NC: U.S. 
Army Special Operations Command, 2014), 6. 
17 George Feifer, “Contain Yourself: The West Needs Containment 2.0,” Foreign Affairs, October 20, 
2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-10-20/contain-yourself.  
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Research on U.S. Cold War deterrence and containment policies shows a shortage 
of focus on political warfare activities in the context of these policies. Since the Cold War, 
the Russian employment of political warfare, anchored by military capabilities, should 
serve as a call for nations such as the United States to deter and counter Russian actions. 
Deterrence should include military and non-military actions to deter both military and 
non-military actions by aggressor states such as Russia. John Lewis Gaddis, a leading 
author on containment strategy, also emphasizes that history, rather than theory, is often a 
better guide to determining transferability of Cold War policies and strategies to present 
conflicts.18 U.S. Cold War history obviously includes military and nuclear-centric 
activities to implement policy. The non-military centric aspects of those policies—through 
the broad categories of strategic influence; support to political, social, and counter 
government groups; and special warfare—also make up a large part of U.S. Cold War 
history.  
Additionally, concepts from social movement theory may also inform U.S. 
political warfare policies. Social movement theory provides a framework for analyzing 
why movements and groups are created and how they evolve. Through this framework, 
nations that are interested in influencing and supporting groups can understand the 
necessary conditions for a successful movement.19 The United States could apply the 
theory and framework to identify how it might influence, exploit, or leverage a population.  
Researcher Doowan Lee suggests that movements and groups have four 
characteristics: broad socioeconomic processes and conditions, expanding political 
opportunities, strategic framing narratives, and indigenous organizational strength.20 First, 
there has to be an impetus that moves a population to organize. The impetus can be 
socioeconomic conditions such as ethnic divisions, economic downturns, or other 
pressures on society. Second, there must be political opportunities that the group can 
leverage, for instance, cohesion or division among elites, the civil-military structure, and 
                                                 
18 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 287.  
19 Glenn Johnson and Doowan Lee, “Revisiting the Social Movement approach to Unconventional 
Warfare,” Small Wars Journal, December 1, 2014, www.smallwarsjournal.com/printpdf/18227, 1. 
20 Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare,” Special Warfare 
Magazine, July–September 2013, 29.  
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influential dissidents. Third, to leverage these conditions and opportunities, a movement 
or group must have a consistent narrative that motivates the population to join it. The final 
characteristic is the actual strength and capability of the organization to effect change. 
Leaders, resources, and popular support must form under shared values and structures that 
will sustain the group through any adversity it faces. These characteristics can provide 
insight into the decision-making process for political warfare activities, which are all 
essentially based on influencing, engaging and leveraging groups. 
A 2011 study, grounded in concepts from social movement theory, reviewed 323 
violent and non-violent movements from the 20th century and their quest for political and 
government changes. The study authors, Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, found that 
between 1900 and 2006, nonviolent resistance campaigns against authoritarian regimes 
were twice as likely to succeed as violent campaigns. The study suggests that for an 
outside assistance to produces better results and more sustainable outcomes, the assistance 
must be provided well before confrontations between the movement and the authoritarian 
regime becomes violent.21  
Chenoweth and Stephan also found that one of the reasons for the movements’ 
successes was that non-violent resistance campaigns attract a more diverse base of 
participants. A diverse supporter base includes women, professionals, religious figures, 
and civil servants. This broad spectrum of participants reduces the risk of violent 
crackdowns as opposed to movements organized mostly of young, able-bodied men 
trained as militants. When young men compose the majority of the movement’s 
participant’s, security forces are more likely to use violence to quell the movement. A 
broad spectrum of participants also produces mass participation as well as regime 
defections. It also allows for the employment of flexible tactics that deteriorate the 
relationship between a regime and groups, such as the media, economic elites, and even 
religious authorities.22 Also, as noted by U.S. Department of Defense special operations 
leadership, “Nonviolent movements find it much easier to garner backing from the 
                                                 
21 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, “Drop Your Weapons: When and Why Civil Resistance 
Works,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 4, July/August 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2014-06-
16/drop-your-weapons.  
22 Ibid.  
9international community.”23 Attracting support from the international community may 
then allow for the movement to continue its development and progress to effect change. 
The tools and activities of political warfare are centered on the population just as 
concepts from social movement theory are centered on the population. While it is not 
explicit, viewing groups through the characteristics and criteria outlined in social 
movement theory research implies that there are ways to leverage, support, and influence 
existing networks. U.S. experiences in the Cold War provide examples of varying degrees 
of covert and overt actions that influenced, leveraged, or exploited a population using 
political warfare. This experience, combined with academic context and frameworks, can 
provide a foundation for future political warfare policies. Addressing the gaps and 
supplementing with concepts from social movement theory, this thesis explores political 
warfare activities executed in support of U.S. Cold War deterrence and containment 
policies.  
D. METHOD OF INQUIRY 
This thesis fills a gap in the literature about non-military and non-nuclear options 
in deterrence and containment by exploring three broad categories of political warfare: 
strategic influence; support to political, social, and counter-government groups; and 
special warfare. The framework is based on a form of structured, focused comparison, as 
described by Alexander George, to test hypotheses that correspond with the three 
categories.24 The three hypotheses tested in this study are as follows 
1. Strategic influence operations that justify a nation’s actions and explain its
beliefs while delegitimizing the aggressor’s narrative are critical to
successful political warfare campaigns.
2. Support to political, social, and counter-government groups to undermine
Russian political warfare and exploit vulnerabilities in target societies may
play a key role in current deterrence and containment policies.
23 Cleveland et al., “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone.”  
24 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2004), 67. 
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3. Political warfare activities are integral to special warfare doctrine thereby 
effectively positioning special operations forces (SOF) to support and 
synchronize political warfare strategies. 
Approaching the research question through the hypotheses and three broad 
categories of political warfare illustrates the other aspects of U.S. containment and 
deterrence policies in the political warfare environment during the Cold War. This 
approach should help illuminate the path ahead for U.S. policies to counter Russian 
political warfare in the 21st century. 
E. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis is organized around the hypotheses and how they help shape the answer 
to the research question and ultimately inform policy recommendations. Chapter II 
establishes the context for the similarities between Soviet Cold War and Russian post–
Cold War political warfare activities. Chapter III explores U.S. strategic influence actions 
and policies during the Cold War to understand the use and effects of those programs and 
policies as a test for the first hypothesis. Chapter IV reviews U.S. covert and overt support 
to political, social, and counter-government groups. Also in Chapter IV, social movement 
theory introduced in Chapter I literature review provides a framework to glean 
information from U.S. experience combined with academic research. Chapter V considers 
the special warfare role in Cold War and post–Cold War operations as an integrating 
element. Chapter VI analyzes the validity of the three hypotheses for answering the 
research question. The thesis concludes with recommendations for U.S. policy.  
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II. SOVIET AND RUSSIAN POLITICAL WARFARE 
Though U.S. deterrence and containment policies may have contributed to the 
Soviet Union’s downfall, the Soviet Union still proved adept at using all possible 
instruments of national power to spread its influence. Over the course of the Cold War, the 
Soviet Union relied on a combination of security and military intelligence services as well 
as diplomatic and economic levers to conduct synchronized campaigns around the world. 
The Soviet Union used these levers to gain influence and economic interdependence 
within each of the target countries. Additionally, the Soviet Union used these instruments 
to support communist and socialist parties around the world to actively intimidate the 
existing government structures.  
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has employed political warfare 
doctrine even as it has supposedly reformed parts of its government. There is indeed an 
appearance of democracy coupled with economic and foreign relations reforms that give 
the impression of a changed government system. The updated policies have positioned and 
given Russia a platform from which to project power and influence outside its borders. 
The respective 2008 and 2014 interventions in Georgia and Ukraine are great illustrations 
of Russia’s use of political warfare. While Russia presumably recognizes its conventional 
military weaknesses, it can use other instruments of national power to project influence 
and achieve its objectives similar to Soviet Union actions during the Cold War. 
A. SOVIET UNION POLICIES AND ACTIONS 
As the Soviet Union began to consolidate its control in Eastern Europe, it only had 
to exercise a minimal level of influence and exploitation over the vulnerable communities 
and countries rebuilding after WWII. The Soviets took control of radio stations, 
dismantled civil society organizations and youth groups, and installed Moscow-trained 
secret police in every country.25 In every country in Eastern Europe, Stalin had communist 
envoys influencing political systems in a way that created one-party elections, such as 
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what happened in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.26 Additionally, the Soviet Union ignored 
election results in Hungary in 1945 and falsified election results in Poland in 1946.27 
Russia installed a communist government in Romania and ousted the Bulgarian prime 
minister while also staging a communist coup in Czechoslovakia in early 1948.28 
Furthermore, each of these events started with the sponsorship of pro-communist 
movements and political parties. 
As the Cold War persisted, the Soviets continued to support pro-communist 
movements and parties to establish control over many governments.29 The Soviet Union 
supported upwards of 80 communist and socialist parties throughout the world and 
actively intimidated internal and external opponents.30 Additionally, the Soviets organized 
demonstrations to initiate public support for the disbandment of opposition parties and 
movements. To extend influence, the Soviet Union combined these tactics with influence 
measures (propaganda) and the secret police, exploiting journalists, academics, labor 
leaders, prominent citizens, and government officials who supported, and would later 
execute, Kremlin political warfare. These tactics came to be known as “active measures.” 
They were planned and sometimes executed by the Komitent Gosudarstevenoi 
Bezopasnosti (KGB), but eventually a wide range of actors became involved in active 
measures.31  
The foundation of the Soviet Union’s strategy during the Cold War was to use 
political warfare. It relied on this strategy to conduct a synchronized campaign that 
consolidated and solidified its gains in Eastern Europe while attempting to expand into 
underdeveloped and vulnerable countries around the world.32 Soviet operations included, 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 196. 
27 Ibid., 205–212. 
28 Ibid., 222. 
29 Robert C. Tucker, “The Paths of Communist Revolution, 1917–67,” in The Soviet Union: A Half-
century of Communism, ed. Kurt London (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 31.  
30 Ibid., 35. 
31 Department of State, Active Measures Working Group, Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on 
Active Measures and Propaganda, 1987–1988 (Department of State Publication 9720) (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of States Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 1989), 35. 
32 Tucker, “The Paths of Community Revolution,” 36.  
 13
but were not limited to, subversion, media manipulation, and propaganda. It was a critical 
aspect, and often a first step, of Soviet strategy to establish or support communist parties, 
instigate movements and demonstrations, and support criminal or proxy organizations.33 
The Soviet objective was to use all available instruments to project influence into Europe 
and abroad while simultaneously denying and deterring United States influence. 
B. POST–COLD WAR RUSSIA 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the new nation struggled to find its 
place in the world order.34 Russia appeared to attempt democratic and economic reforms 
while struggling to remain a powerful player on the world stage. Externally, Russian 
policies of influence turned to protecting the diaspora in the so-called near abroad as a 
way to recoup some of the losses of the empire.35 Additionally, Russia began reasserting 
its control over ethnic Russians and those who were responsive to Russian policies. Doing 
so positioned the nation and gave it a platform from which to project power and influence 
outside its borders.  
As Baltic states began declaring independence in the 1990s, the Russian diaspora 
proved a winning excuse for intervention. Researcher Agnia Grigas describes the 
continued interventions as helping Russia maintain a “zone of privileged interest.”36 
Exerting influence in the Baltic states also supported geopolitical interests for access and 
freedom of movement in the Baltic Sea, which the Kremlin had dominated in the 18th and 
19th centuries and throughout the Cold War.37 In Lithuania, the Russians supported the 
communist party and the Yedinstvo movement of ethnic Russians who were fighting for 
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independence inside the country.38 Propaganda and organized worker protests were both 
part of the tactics the Russians used to exert power there. Eventually, the Russian military 
deployed into Lithuania under the auspices of keeping law and order for Russian citizens 
in the country.39 Around the same time, the Russians sent “volunteers” along with military 
support to assist the growing separatist movement in Moldova.40 The policy of protecting 
Russian citizens provided an opportunity for intervention and influence in countries in the 
Russian near abroad.  
Starting in the early 2000s, the domestic political conditions of small, fragmented, 
and weak political parties made the Baltic countries ripe for Russian influence.41 Ethnic 
Russians comprise approximately 30 percent of the population in Latvia and Estonia. 
While Russian minority political parties have not established footholds in the larger 
domestic coalition governments, the mayors of major cities, such as Riga, Latvia, and 
Tallinn, Estonia, are ethnic Russians who represent the Russian-minority political parties 
in their respective countries.42 Throughout the Baltics, Russia creates and maintains 
Kremlin-friendly networks through organizational assistance, media strategies and 
campaigns, financial contributions, and personal and professional linkages.43 These 
linkages are often among interest groups, political organizations, and businesses. 
Throughout Latvia and Lithuania, Russia funds political organizations and disinformation 
campaigns and bribes individuals. The “color revolutions” in Ukraine, Georgia, and 
Kyrgyzstan have also served as justification for Russia’s assertiveness in its old stomping 
grounds. During these revolutions, Russia was able to project its anti-Western narrative in 
the information realm of political warfare.44  
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Russia’s 2008 intervention in Georgia is reminiscent of Soviet actions abroad 
during the Cold War. First, Russia denied its involvement while using proxies to execute 
its plan on the ground. Additionally, it used propaganda and cyber warfare to manipulate 
economic conditions—all to stress the government and the population.45 Russia cultivated 
lessons learned from the Cold War and post–Cold War era to use in the Georgia conflict. 
After its United Nations (UN)-sanctioned involvement in Georgian politics—through 
peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia—Russia sowed dissent and 
established its influence both militarily and diplomatically in the country.46 
Simultaneously, then Prime Minister Putin asserted influence by placing former Russians 
into key ministry positions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.47  
Through its political access to Georgian systems and the resulting tensions created 
between the government and the people, Russia manipulated the political landscape in 
Georgia. Due to its shared border, it was able to accelerate its plan by easily inserting the 
Russian military into Georgia. Additionally, Russia changed its own laws and treaties to 
support its efforts in Georgia. Moreover, Russia’s cyber warfare tactics at the outbreak of 
military escalation denied and disrupted Georgian communications networks while 
accumulating intelligence on Georgian military and political networks.48 After five days 
of combat operations, Russian President Medvedev negotiated a peace plan that officially 
sanctioned Russian dominance on the Georgia/Russia border region.49 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine in 2013 also showed the culmination of long-term 
political warfare. Russia shares not only a border with Ukraine but also an interdependent 
economy, military-industrial partnership, and a Russian diaspora. The relationship with, 
and influence in, Ukraine have been vital to Russian leaders and national objectives for 
decades. Through information campaigns and the use of an extensive pro-Russian 
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network, Russia has continuously perpetuated Russian-friendly narratives while exploiting 
opportunities to sow dissent between the people and the Ukrainian government.50 In the 
last few years, As the Ukrainian government continued to pursue further ties with the 
West, Russia moved for further disruption of Ukrainian politics and continued 
delegitimization of the Ukrainian government.51 The variety and complexity of these 
actions reflect the intensity of Russia’s political warfare. 
Russian political warfare in Ukraine included a host of actions targeting specific 
populations in the country. Russia issued passports to the Russian diaspora and promoted 
tensions between the Ukrainian Tartar population and the Russian Orthodox Church.52 
Russia used front organizations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine to promote anti-Western 
and anti-NATO sentiment. In addition, Russian proxies also encouraged book and school 
burning while publishing and distributing anti-Ukrainian newspapers.53 Furthermore, 
Russia’s physical positioning in Crimea and its continued cultivation of relationships, pro-
Russian movements, and interdependence with the Ukrainian government allowed Russia 
to swiftly exploit the growing unrest in Ukraine to “protect Russian nationals” and foment 
discord in the eastern part of the country.  
C. RUSSIAN POLICY 
A non-official article published by General Valery Gerasimov seemingly describes 
Russian strategy in its near abroad. In early 2013, as the tensions in Ukraine were rising, 
General Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, presented a 
phased model clearly describing Russian intent and actions in political warfare to meet 
national interests. What has become known as the Gerasimov doctrine describes a world 
in which military might and weaponry has been overshadowed by the power of non-
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military means to meet political objectives.54 Gerasimov describes non-military means as 
“the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary 
measures- applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population.”55 
Gerasimov also clearly states that though the use of special operations and other military 
forces may be necessary, it is often under the guise of other missions to carry out 
subversion, coercion, and classic unconventional warfare tactics.56 In addition, Maciej 
Bartkowski of Johns Hopkins notes that Putin and the Russian Security Council seemingly 
made the Gerasimov doctrine official Russian policy after approving an updated Russian 
military doctrine in December 2014, which was strikingly similar to the strategy 
Gerasimov lays out in his article.57 
Gerasimov’s model is clear about the roles of each instrument of national power 
and the synchronization of these instruments. As shown in Figure 1, from left to right, the 
model delineates the phases of resolving intergovernmental conflicts beginning with 
covert instigation of problems within society and ending with establishing peace. The 
bottom half of the model shows at which phase military and non-military actions will be 
executed. Finally, the model demonstrates that non-military activities play a central role in 
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Figure 1.  The Gerasimov Doctrine58 
The military tool is not neglected in the Gerasimov doctrine, but it is 
deemphasized and serves as a coercive measure to reinforce non-military activities in the 
strategy. While in Georgia and Ukraine the military conducted traditional military 
activities, it was not until after non-military actions had prepared the operational area for 
the ease of use of the military. The Gerasimov doctrine clearly brings to bear all 
instruments of national power. In describing the model, Gerasimov also points out that the 
human domain of society is the target.59 By using all instruments of national power to 
form coalitions, unions, and political opposition parties and to bring political economic 
and diplomatic pressure, Russia is influencing society—not just the targeted government. 
General Gerasimov’s article and the new military doctrine combined with Russian actions 
in Ukraine indicate official Russian approval for political warfare abroad. It all highlights 
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how Russia sees modern conflict: indirect and asymmetric modes of action in coordination 
with non-military means implemented via the population, political forces, and social 
movements. Addressing modern conflict in this manner is not much different than Soviet 
counter-measures of the Cold War.  
Russian policy and strategy for information warfare has evolved, too. The 
evolution includes updated training and execution methods for the military and non-
military alike.60 Modern Russian information warfare is derived from its long tradition of 
spetzpropaganda (special propaganda), which has been a staple at in the Russian Military 
Information and Foreign Languages Department of the Military University of the Ministry 
of Defense.61 The training includes tools to organize, develop, monitor and analyze 
foreign information and military communication.62 All levels of government are included 
in Russian information warfare doctrine. It is taught to and expected to be executed by, not 
just the military, but also intelligence operatives, journalists, and diplomats. Just like the 
Gerasimov doctrine, the information warfare doctrine is about using both military and 
non-military means to achieve diplomatic leverage to meet foreign policy goals.63  
Russia has used a three-pronged approach for information warfare policies since 
the 1990s. The first prong concerns politicians and diplomats who shape and drive the 
international environment, as evidenced by Russian propaganda targeting the political 
systems of its opponents. The second prong involves domestic implementation of 
information security doctrines and policies to influence the minds of Russian citizens. The 
media in Russia is controlled by the state, ensuring that its citizens only see and hear what 
the Russian government want them to. The third prong is using the military to conduct 
information warfare. The military and other agents of the government are indoctrinated 
with the concepts of information warfare and are expected to implement its tactics at every 
turn. Additionally, the presence of the military in a more traditional manner enhances 
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Russian information-warfare activities. Its capacity as a credible military tool is coercive 
and supports non-military means. Military strength, though in the background, supports 
the extensive use of non-military means which central to meeting Russian foreign policy 
objectives.64 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The Soviet Union was adept at using all of its instruments of national power, from 
diplomatic to military powers, during the Cold War and now Russia continues that 
tradition in the post–Cold War era. A seemingly academic article published by a senior 
military general foreshadowed a newly approved military doctrine focusing on political 
warfare. Russia has used all instruments of national power to extend influence and exploit 
vulnerabilities—as evidenced by its actions in the Baltics, Ukraine, and Georgia—
showing that all possible methods for executing these policies are acceptable. Russia’s 
2014 intervention in Ukraine is merely the culmination of political warfare actions that 
began more than a decade before. Russia’s use of political warfare allows it to remain 
influential and dominant on the world stage.  
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III. U.S. COLD WAR STRATEGIC INFLUENCE 
The terms information operations, psychological operations, public diplomacy, 
strategic communication, and public affairs are all familiar concepts when planning and 
executing programs intended to influence a target audience. In 2003 and in separate 
academic forums, Colonel Brad Ward and Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Susan Gough broadly 
labeled these activities strategic influence.65 LTC Gough defines strategic influence as 
follows: 
The deliberate, conscious coordination or integration of all government 
informational activities designed to influence opinions, attitudes, and 
behavior of foreign groups in ways that will promote U.S. national 
objectives, combined with other elements of national power to achieve 
maximum psychological effect.66 
In 2009, RAND conducted a study for the U.S. Army on influence operations. 
similar to Ward and Gough’s definition of strategic influence, RAND defines influence 
operations as follows: 
the coordinated, integrated, and synchronized application of national 
diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and other capabilities in 
peacetime, crisis, conflict, and post conflict to foster attitudes, behaviors, or 
decisions by foreign target audiences that further U.S. interests and 
objectives.67 
This chapter uses the term strategic influence, as defined by Ward and Gough, and 
includes the concepts and ideas from RAND’s definition of influence operations.  
Throughout the Cold War, U.S. policies for strategic influence oscillated between 
high and low priority. The goal of strategic influence activities during the Cold War was to 
counter determined and steadfast Soviet influence operations. To the United States, the 
Soviet Union’s objectives and actions were as dangerous as those of the Nazi’s during 
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World War II. The Soviet Union was showing its unrestrained eagerness to influence both 
foreign and domestic audiences with truths, half-truths, lies, and rumors. Scholars believe 
that U.S. strategic influence activities during the Cold War ultimately contributed to the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. For this reason, the hypothesis for framing the chapter is as 
follows: 
Strategic influence operations that justify a nation’s actions and explain its 
beliefs while delegitimizing the aggressor’s narratives are critical to 
successful political warfare campaigns.  
Executing strategic influence in the 21st century against a resurgent Russia should rely on 
an understanding of what tools were successful during the Cold War.  
A. THE COLD WAR BEGINS 
At the end of military operations in Europe, General Eisenhower wrote, 
“Psychological warfare had developed as a specific and effective weapon” and that given 
the choice, every commander and government used psychological warfare to influence the 
population, whether enemy, ally, or domestic.68 By the end of the Cold War, American-
sponsored newspapers were being delivered to ally and enemy troops and former enemy 
populations; over eight billion leaflets were dropped in the Mediterranean and European 
theaters.69 American cartoons, pamphlets, posters, books, magazines, movies, and radio 
broadcasts flooded every space within U.S. reach.  
As a result of the aggressive propaganda from Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union 
during WWII, many in the United States outside of the military viewed strategic influence 
and psychological operations as being in poor taste. At the conclusion of the war, 
President Truman’s administration immediately dismantled the majority of the strategic 
influence machine.70 The Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS) were quickly liquidated.71 Both organizations had executed and directed 
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government-sponsored propaganda at home and abroad. The widely held notion was that 
the United States would not need these tools anymore.  
Shortly thereafter, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union 
began with a tit-for-tat series of actions in an effort to assert dominance and influence 
around the world. In April 1947, the Voice of America radio program, a remaining vestige 
of WWII psychological operations, began broadcasting to the Soviet Union to counter 
Soviet propaganda against the United States.72 Two months later, the United States 
announced the Marshall Plan, designed to restore political stability and revitalize Europe 
with the secondary objective of spreading U.S. ideals in the region. To undermine the 
Marshall Plan and the strategic influence activities supporting it, the Soviet Union 
established the Communist Information Bureau (COMINFORM) to create a network for 
influence operations through European communist parties.73 COMINFORM then 
prompted the United States to reassemble the strategic influence machine that had been 
dismantled just two years before.  
The newly reassembled strategic influence machine included the cogs of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National 
Security Council (NSC), which had been established through the National Security Act of 
1947. Each of the organizations had its own strategic influence arms and the NSC itself 
also eventually served as a coordinating board for the implementation of strategic 
influence activities during the Cold War. In its new role as a policy and coordinating arm, 
the NSC immediately passed a set of directives that would set the direction for strategic 
influence programs. The NSC Presidential National Security Policy Decision 4 and 4A 
directed the interagency to bolster and implement programs designed to influence foreign 
opinion on the Soviet Union and the United States.74 NSC 4 charged the Department of 
State with coordinating the various overt programs scattered across the government as 
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well as directed the newly formed CIA to plan and implement covert psychological 
operations.75  
The initial approach for the influence programs was for a narrative that represented 
the United States in an objective and straightforward manner. The “Full and Fair” 
approach, as outlined by George Kennan, was linked to a political warfare strategy 
directed at the Soviet intelligentsia.76 Those who made up the Soviet intelligentsia were 
considered influential but did not have a formal role within the Soviet Union decision-
making structure.77 The State Department’s Assistant Secretary Benton, who was 
responsible for the execution of overt strategic influence programs, believed that 
“misrepresentation and propaganda” had no place in this approach to target the Soviet 
intelligentsia.78  
The Full and Fair strategy was intended to directly oppose the Soviet programs that 
involved slandering and lying to their audiences. This approach was used for two years 
until the Soviets tested their nuclear bomb. Concurrent to the nuclear bomb test, the 
Soviets unveiled their “Hate America” campaign. The Truman administration declared the 
campaign as involving “the spread of false information designed to convince satellite 
countries that communism was superior to democracy,” that the Soviets were 
peacemakers, and that the United States was a warmongering nation.79 The combination 
of events forced U.S. policymakers to change strategic influence tactics.  
The new tactic, the “Campaign of Truth,” was proposed as a full-fledged anti- 
communist propaganda campaign. The NSC described the Soviet Union as the biggest 
threat believing that the United States must respond in kind with a massive internal and 
external build-up of political, economic, and military strength.80 Just 10 months later, the 
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outbreak of the Korean War seemed to confirm the dangers of Soviet expansion and 
aggressiveness. The war led to the congressional approval of an $89 million budget to 
fund the stridently anti-communist “Campaign of Truth.” The full and fair approach was 
no longer felt to be an option for competing with the aggressive nature of the Soviet 
Union. Therefore, the United States turned to equally aggressive anti-Soviet strategic 
influence activities.  
The “Campaign of Truth” targeted 28 critical areas of the world, including Iran, 
South Korea, Indochina, Thailand, Greece, Afghanistan, Finland, and the Soviet satellite 
regions.81 The messaging sought to empower those under communist rule to gain their 
own freedom, hopefully inciting an anticommunist revolution and encouraging defections 
among the elites. Assistant Secretary of State, at the time, Edward Barrett said there was a 
need “to expose to all the world the fallacies and the phony nature of communism.”82 
Activities emphasized dismal living conditions and blamed the Soviet Union for shortages 
of fuel, vegetables, and dairy. They also reported on widespread arrests and long prison 
sentences in the communist controlled countries. During this time, the Department of State 
programs alone were in 93 countries, produced 60 million booklets and leaflets, and 
broadcasted the Voice of America in 45 languages.83 The strategic influence policies were 
focused on an aggressive hardline approach to anti-communist propaganda as a way to 
beat communism while avoiding direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union.84  
After two years of the “Campaign of Truth” disagreement about the tenor of the 
messaging reappeared in Congress and the administration. Some congressional leaders 
were supportive of the hardline mission while others wanted to focus on the strengths of 
the United States rather than weaknesses of the Soviet Union. An inadvertent consequence 
of the “Campaign of Truth” was the Soviet counter to the narrative. The Soviets declared 
it as the United States being defensive about democracy and thus demonstrating 
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communism’s political virility and democracy’s fragility.85 Eventually, President Truman 
implemented a new policy calling for more positive themes to offset the defensive nature 
of the Campaign of Truth narrative.  
B. THE EISENHOWER ERA 
President Eisenhower understood the wide role of strategic influence in political 
warfare. Upon assuming his presidency, he made three important changes to Cold War 
strategic influence policies.86 The most important of the three was the establishment of the 
U.S. Information Agency (USIA). For almost 40 years, it served as the only cabinet-level 
agency to oversee overt information programs abroad. Other changes included replacing 
Truman’s psychological strategy board with the Operation Coordinating Board (OCB) to 
synchronize national security policy and develop more detailed plans for strategic 
influence activities.87 Additionally, President Eisenhower appointed a special assistant for 
psychological warfare to advise him on policies and to assist with coordination of the 
strategic influence activities.88 The latter two changes were an effort to provide centralized 
leadership for propaganda policy and, in effect, elevate strategic influence within the 
overall foreign policy structure.89  
Based on the conclusion that it was less effective, the president continued the 
change in policy away from the “Campaign of Truth.” Two committees, established for 
review of U.S. strategic influence programs, recommended that U.S. strategic influence 
policy should no longer have an aggressive anti-communist tone because it “had become 
increasingly less effective as it … [became] more an instrument of propaganda and less an 
instrument of information.”90 U.S. strategic influence operations were thus refocused on 
creating generational changes in the Soviet intelligentsia.  
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New NSC policies approved in 1955 and 1956 signaled U.S. political warfare 
programs to further exploit vulnerabilities within the Soviet Union.91 Additionally, the 
policies also cemented the strategic influence pivot reinforcing the concept of making 
evolutionary changes within the Soviet Union that were intended to eventually influence 
and shift Soviet policies.92 The pivot was called “cultural infiltration,” and it was intended 
to take advantage of what many were calling the “thaw period.” During this period, it was 
believed that many in the intelligentsia and the Soviet youth were feeling alienated from 
the communist ideology, and they were thought to be open to outside ideas and anxious to 
join the larger world community. Strategic influence activities supporting the pivot also 
had elements of convincing the people of the inferiority of the Soviet Union.93  
During the beginning of this pivot, the narrative also included ideas of liberation and 
freedom from communist enslavement. The narrative was not supported by policies that 
would support liberation movements though. Unfortunately, the 1956 Hungarian uprising 
provided a powerful lesson in integrated policies and strategies for political warfare. The 
people of Hungary mistakenly believed the narrative of liberation meant that the United 
States would reinforce attempts at resistance with actual military assistance. Unfortunately 
for the Hungarians, the United States was not prepared to do so, and the Soviet Union 
delivered a crushing military response to the uprising.94 The Eisenhower administration 
soon moved away from strategic influence messaging that included the concepts of 
liberation from the Soviet Union.  
C. THE “ICE AGE” TO AN AGE WITHOUT THE SOVIET UNION 
The post–Eisenhower era is known by some as the “Ice Age” for strategic 
influence.95 With Eisenhower as president, strategic influence in all its forms was embraced 
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and served as a critical element of U.S. political warfare.96 The newly elected President 
Kennedy did not have the same feelings. The administration dismantled the OCB and 45 
other interagency committees that dealt with strategic-level Cold War planning and 
execution.97 Additionally, the USIA programming changed to a more aggressive narrative, 
which refuted the idea that the USIA had to be a more objective source of news.98 While it 
was not ignored completely, strategic influence operations throughout the Kennedy 
administration took a back seat to the primacy of counter-insurgency, special warfare, and 
covert political action.99 President Kennedy believed that the Soviet Union-supported “wars 
of liberation” in the third world were the biggest threat to the United States, and special 
warfare activities outside of strategic influence would be the answer.100 
Subsequent administrations through the remainder of the 1960s and 1970s also did 
not give top-level attention to strategic influence, including in the arena of strategic planning 
and coordination. A joint staff study conducted in the 1970s noted that ad hoc committees 
had attempted to fill the void that had led to a lack of coordination and guidance from the 
national security council level for strategic influence programs.101 Parts of the cultural 
infiltration programs, such as cultural exchanges and some radio programs, remained, but 
the emphasis, funding, and other programs did not. During the Vietnam War, military 
psychological operations felt a resurgence, but they were restricted primarily to that theatre 
of operations and were mostly at the tactical level.102 The Vietnam protests and Soviet 
influence programs negated the few successful programmatic gains outside the Vietnam 
theatre. Additionally, the societal cultural revolution and disillusionment with American 
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values and primacy contributed to the limited emphasis the U.S. government placed on 
strategic influence.103 
The Reagan administration re-elevated strategic influence to a top element of 
national security strategy. The administration was determined to end the Cold War. From 
1982 to 1984, President Reagan issued three National Security Decision Directives 
(NSDD) that served as the cornerstone for his strategic influence policies. In 1982, NSDD 
45 revitalized the international broadcasting programs—allowing for an expansion to 
Cuba—and pressed for the continued study of closer integration between the DOD and the 
DoS strategic influence programs.104 In 1983, NSDD 77 established a national security 
council planning group and four standing interagency committees on public affairs, 
international broadcasting, international politics, and international information. It also 
gave authority to the DoS to direct other departments to implement strategic influence 
strategies.105 Finally, NSDD 130 reiterated the importance and role of information 
strategy in national security and cemented strategic influence as a central tool in President 
Reagan’s security policies and strategies. NSDD 130 directed a “sustained commitment 
over time to improving the quality and effectiveness of U.S. international information 
efforts” including resources and coordination with other national security elements.106  
During the thaw in the mid-1980s, U.S. strategic influence measures had affected 
the Soviet intelligentsia and post–World War II generation who were assuming leadership 
positions within the Soviet Union system. The thaw was considered to be a time of 
relative intellectual openness among Soviet citizens, which is why the U.S. strategic 
influence actions during this period are thought to have influenced the Soviet leadership of 
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the 1980s.107 The cultural infiltration policies exploited Soviet communist vulnerabilities 
at a time of relative openness and supported the reemergence of targeted information 
operations during the Reagan administration.108 For the United States, the new Soviet 
leaders of the late 1980s appeared to signal the long-term effectiveness of cultural 
infiltration policies of the 1950s and 1960s.  
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Strategic influence policies changed throughout the Cold War because of a variety of 
factors. The factors ranged from political and public support of the influence concepts to 
opportunities presented from a target population. The policymakers and American public 
wanted to be viewed as full and fair and thus could not remain committed to the early 
strident anti-communist propaganda of the early Cold War. On the same note, the Ice Age in 
strategic influence also proved that both the administration and public must also stridently 
support the role of strategic influence as part of political warfare.  
The Cold War strategic influence policies of virulent propaganda do not appear to be 
the activities that truly influenced the Soviet population. Those programs were stymied by 
the lack of results coupled with the American distaste for propaganda in general. Ultimately, 
success in U.S. strategic influence came more from policies of cultural infiltration, showing 
the positive aspects of American culture, while also providing an alternative to Russian 
media. Implementing the concepts of Full and Fair strategic influence and the cultural 
infiltration program today may not provide immediate gains, but may provide more lasting 
effects.  
As is always the case, there are advantages and disadvantages to a Full and Fair 
approach to strategic influence. Noticeable results of the Cold War’s Full and Fair approach 
were not seen until almost 30 years after implementation. Additionally, the strategic 
influence strategy was synchronized with the greater political warfare policy of the time, 
something the United States currently lacks. However, an approach similar to Full and Fair 
may be less expensive and more palatable and relatable just as it was during the Cold War. 
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Considering the advantages and disadvantages it may pay long-term dividends for the 
United States to contemplate Cold War experiences with Full and Fair and cultural 
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IV. SUPPORT TO POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND COUNTER-
GOVERNMENT GROUPS 
Whereas strategic influence focuses on messaging a target group, support to 
political, social, and counter-government groups is focused on actions that provide 
tangible resources and influence to a group. Supporting these groups is often more 
personal and may even be controversial depending on the type of support and the 
objectives of the group or operation. For the United States, support to a third-party group 
may often take the form of overt democracy assistance but also may include covert action, 
such as political action and paramilitary support. During the Cold War, these activities 
were all intended as a means to contain, roll-back, or deter Soviet Union expansion.  
Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union consistently 
engaged third-party political, social, and counter-government groups around the world. 
Instead of directly confronting each other, the nations used their instruments of national 
power to exploit vulnerabilities elsewhere to influence change in their favor. U.S. Cold 
War policies involved countering Soviet active measures executed to support communist 
expansion. In addition, they were also intended as a means to stabilize a country or 
community that was vulnerable to Soviet exploitation. The controversial aspects of covert 
action in Iran, Chile, and Afghanistan are often cited as examples of U.S. Cold War 
support to political, social, and counter-government groups.  
Understanding the policies and activities of U.S. overt and covert support to third-
party groups can inform a new policy for political warfare with Russia today. The 
hypothesis explored in this chapter is 
Policies must include support to political, social and counter-government 
groups to undermine Russian political warfare and exploit vulnerabilities in 
target societies.  
As noted in previous chapters, Russia continues to influence and exploit vulnerabilities in 
neighboring communities and nations while sponsoring political entities and social groups. 
The U.S. history of third-party support should not be overshadowed by controversy but 
instead provide lessons to counter contemporary Russian actions. This chapter examines 
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U.S. Cold War activities—both covert and overt—that supported political, social, and 
counter-government groups.  
A. COVERT SUPPORT TO POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND COUNTER-
GOVERNMENT GROUPS 
Covert action programs provide a third option for an administration when overt 
assistance and diplomacy do not meet the intended goals and when military force is too 
extreme. Since President Truman signed NSC policy 10/2, covert action has been an 
activity executed by the CIA during peacetime, while also establishing that covert 
operations are to be consistent and supportive of national policy objectives.109 Cold War 
covert action in support of the Marshall Plan, to counter communist expansion in Latin 
American, and Europe were developed in response to foreign threats to U.S. national 
interests. They were a means to support U.S. objectives by influencing foreign 
governments, populations, and leaders in ways that would benefit the United States.110 
Throughout the Cold War, as initiated by President Truman, covert action supported U.S. 
political warfare policies intended to contain, deter, and roll-back the Soviet Union.  
There is a range of different activities within covert action, but this thesis focuses 
on political action, paramilitary operations, and propaganda. Surprisingly, no U.S. 
president or government organization had explicitly defined covert action until President 
Reagan signed Executive Order 12333 in 1981. Covert action is defined as 
Activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad 
which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States 
Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in 
support of such activities, but which are not intended to influence United 
States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not 
include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence 
or related support functions.111 
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Political action is about affecting and influencing the political situation in a target 
country or target group. Activities include, but are not limited to, funding political 
campaigns, funding or instigating demonstrations or strikes, and supporting social groups 
and civil society organizations. Although paramilitary operations can include training 
guerilla and paramilitary forces, it also can include training sanctioned government 
security forces. As noted in Chapter III, covert propaganda is the dissemination of specific 
messages to a target audience via a variety of mediums, such as radio, books, newspapers, 
journals, and leaflets. At the heart of covert action is the requirement to hide the U.S. hand 
in the activity while still achieving national objectives.  
The first foray into covert action was political action in the French and Italian 
elections in 1948. The political action programs in the elections were supporting efforts to 
execute the Marshall Plan, which at the time was gaining traction in the U.S. Congress as 
a way to rebuild Europe and stem the expansion of Soviet influence. In France and Italy, 
the communist parties had declared political war on the Marshal Plan and the United 
States. In November 1947, in response to growing fears about the communist parties, 
President Truman signed policy directive NSC 1 and, subsequently, NSC 2 and 3. These 
policies directed all elements of national power, including the newly formed CIA, to 
defeat the communists in the impending French and Italian elections.112  
Political action is considered generally inexpensive but can take long-term 
commitment depending on the requirements. The political action program in Italy 
continued after the initial successes of the late 1940s through the late 1960s when the 
Italian communist party finally collapsed.113 In Italy alone, the CIA spent $200 million in 
aid and programs to support moderate and anti-communist parties. An interesting note 
with the Italian case is that Alcide de Gasperi, who the United States favored and who 
eventually won the 1948 elections, would not accept U.S. support unless all non-
communist parties received support.114 Spreading the U.S. support to all non-communist 
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parties was thought to be a means of maintaining a sense of democracy and avoiding the 
idea of a rigged election by the Americans. In France, the CIA undermined the influence 
of communist labor leaders spending millions of dollars on election campaigns and anti-
communist propaganda.115  
U.S. programs in the Philippines and Japan defeated communist movements and 
parties while cementing U.S. influence in key Asian countries. Throughout the 1950s in 
the Philippines, covert action against the Hukbalahap (Huk) rebellion included a 
combination of paramilitary support to revitalize the Philippine military but also political 
action to support political parties and the election process.116 In Japan, political action 
programs supporting the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LPD) and individual entities 
continued from President Eisenhower through the Nixon administration. While there are 
charges that the LPD dominated and controlled party politics for 40 years, the action is 
also credited with thwarting socialist opponents in Japan.117  
Operation TPAJAX, the program to overthrow Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad 
Mossadegh, is controversial to some but serves as an example of influencing and 
supporting a political and social group through covert action. TPAJAX is viewed as 
controversial to some because the support provided to the Iranian Shah and his followers 
is viewed as hypocritical, as the United States promoted the values of democracy but still 
intervened in a democratic process. Activities in TPAJAX consisted mainly of propaganda 
and political action though there was an element of paramilitary operations resulting in a 
coup. The CIA instigated demonstrations and riots while using propaganda to influence 
the Iranian people and military elites against the prime minister and in favor of the Shah. 
The Shah, with the support of the military, eventually forced Mossadegh to resign.118 
During the 26 years the Shah reigned in Iran, the United States had access to intelligence 
listening sites on Soviet missile test ranges. These listening sites were used to collect 
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information on Soviet missile characteristics and to later verify Soviet compliance with 
arms reduction treaties.119 The manager of the program, Kermit Roosevelt, believed that 
the operation succeeded because the people and the Iranian Army already supported the 
Shah; thus, the agency did not have to create support but only bolster existing momentum 
in the country.120  
Future U.S. presidential administrations and CIA leadership did not always heed 
the lessons learned from TPAJAX. In Guatemala, Kermit Roosevelt’s lesson on the 
importance of supporting existing movements and individuals seemed to be ignored. 
Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman relied heavily on the Guatemalan 
communist party for support, though it is unclear whether the Soviets themselves were 
supporting him.121 The operation to oust Arbenz, code-named PBSUCCESS, included 
propaganda but relied heavily on creating and supporting the Guatemalan rebels led by 
former Guatemalan Army officer, Castillo-Armas. The Castillo-Armas force never truly 
enjoyed popular support and could not gain enough influence to oust Arbenz and assume 
control of the country. The turmoil caused by the covert action, including aerial bombing 
and sinking of supply ships, led to the Guatemalan Army forcing the resignation of 
President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman.122 The operation itself was deemed a covert action 
success, though detractors would point to 40 years of military dictatorship that would 
eventually kill hundreds of thousands of Guatemalans.123  
Similar to Guatemala, the political action program in Chile highlighted the 
extremes to which an administration might go to ensure the target does not receive internal 
or external support from the Soviet Union or communist parties. The Chilean program 
started with the Kennedy administration in 1962. It was a supporting activity to the overt 
democracy assistance provided through the “Alliance for Progress” agreement the 
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Kennedy administration signed in Latin America.124 The initial U.S. support to the 
Chilean rightist party under Eduardo Frei was relatively inexpensive, uncontroversial, and 
kept the communist and Soviet supported party and its leader Salvador Allende, out of 
power until 1970. According to Chilean law, a person cannot hold office in two 
consecutive terms, so Frei was ineligible to run again. When the Christian Democratic 
Party could not field an alternative candidate attractive to the United States, the political 
action program turned to “spoiling operations.”  
The redirection of the program was an example of the seemingly extreme measures 
the administration was willing to take to influence the politics of a nation. Spoiling 
operations included buying congressional votes, propaganda to discredit Allende, and the 
plans for a potential military coup.125 The spoiling operations failed, and Allende 
eventually became president. Two years later, in 1973, a military coup ejected him from 
the presidency resulting in many years of a military dictatorship in the country. Though 
the United States was not involved in the 1973 coup, detractors believe that previous U.S. 
anti-Allende programs were the catalyst for the coup and subsequent dictatorship. The 
programs in the Guatemalan and Chilean cases may have been programmatic successes, 
but the emphasis on paramilitary activity and the ousting of a popularly supported entity 
resulted in controversial outcomes.  
In Europe and the Soviet Union, U.S. covert action programs were extensive and 
had long-term objectives. The decades-long programs ranged from support to trade unions 
and anti-Soviet political entities to the infiltration of books and magazines behind the Iron 
Curtain.126 Another operation, the “nationalities” program, spanned multiple 
administrations and was intended to ensure the heritage, culture, and languages of ethnic 
minorities in the Soviet Union were maintained. The secondary objective was that it 
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would also serve as a direct attack on the internal legitimacy of the Soviet government.127 
Each U.S. administration considered the aforementioned programs, and many others like 
them, necessary to influencing the political leanings of those in the Soviet Union.  
In the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. policy focused on countering Soviet active measures 
and exploiting the growing dissention in the Soviet Union. President Carter initiated 
programs that were targeted at the exploitation of the internal political situation and 
dissident movements gaining momentum in the Soviet Union.128 For example, the 
Solidarity movement in Poland is thought by many to be the impetus for the eventual fall 
of the Soviet Union. Following the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981, the United 
States and the Vatican both worked to provide support to the movement that had taken 
root during the 1970s.129 The success of Solidarity cannot be solely attributed to United 
States or the Vatican, but it is believed that without support from either entity, the 
movement would have taken much longer and may not have stayed peaceful. Researcher 
Carl Bernstein suggests that because Solidarity already enjoyed popular support, covert 
action was merely required to support marginally through the provision of funds and 
supplies, and often intelligence, to ensure the movement could continue to operate.130  
Throughout the Cold War, many of the policies that used covert action were 
explicitly anti-communist and centered on influencing groups and populations. The 
policies included covert action programs to address problems and situations that could not 
be solved solely through overt means but were in concert with overt activities. Henry 
Kissinger, national security advisor to two administrations, said that these programs were 
often initiated to “promote internal change” as well.131 For the United States, covert 
support to political, social, and counter-government groups was a means to prevent 
                                                 
127 Daugherty, Executive Secrets, 74.  
128 Ibid., 185. 
129 Carl Bernstein, “The Holy Alliance,” Time Magazine, June 24, 2001, http://content.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,159069,00.html.  
130 Ibid. 
131 Allan E. Goodman, Twentieth Century Fund, and Bruce D. Berkowitz, The Need to Know: The 
Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Covert Action and American Democracy (New York: 
Century Foundation Press, 1992), 39.  
 40
communist expansion and deal with the impending dangers of pro-communist regimes. 
Covert activities that were likely to receive widespread approval if revealed were those 
that supported popularly backed entities, remained relatively inexpensive, and often did 
not go to what many would consider as extremes to institute change.132 Conversely, the 
controversial covert activities were those where the requirement for popular support and 
authentic leadership capabilities of a group were overshadowed by traditional 
characteristics of military strengths—particularly in covert paramilitary operations. Those 
programs often resulted in what could be described as programmatic successes with 
controversial results.  
B. OVERT DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE 
Thomas Carothers, a democracy assistance researcher, describes two approaches to 
democracy assistance: political and developmental. In the political approach to democracy 
assistance, the essential institutions of politics—elections, political parties, and politically 
oriented civil society groups—receive the support and aid. The political approach to 
democracy assistance has many of the same tactics as covert political action; except that in 
this approach, the support is overt and not shielded from outside scrutiny. In the 
developmental approach to democracy assistance, the support and assistance is intended to 
address concerns about equality and justice while educating people on the concepts of 
democracy. The objective of democracy assistance programs is to create a functioning 
government and state system through sustainable long-term changes within political and 
socioeconomic populations.133  
During the Cold War, the United States began executing democracy assistance 
programs as an overt means to support political goals to fight the expansion of 
communism. Democracy assistance was provided out of concern about Soviet and 
communist exploitation of vulnerable nations and communities rather than out of concern 
for the development and future of the nations and democracy itself. The lines of effort for 
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democracy assistance were assisting elections, strengthening the administration of justice, 
and encouraging the population to participate in governance. All instruments of national 
power were involved in democracy assistance programs, but generally, the DoS, U.S. 
Agency for International Development USAID, and congressionally funded organizations, 
such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), were the primary executors of 
these programs. The administrations’ policies provided the focus for programs and thus 
affected the consistency, location, and emphasis of the programs.  
Since the 1950s, the use of overt assistance has ebbed and flowed with U.S. 
interest in supporting international development and democracy. Democracy assistance is 
a byproduct of development assistance, which gained prevalence during President 
Kennedy’s administration. In the Kennedy administration, there was a general feeling that 
the United States, with its energy and resources, could help third-world nations move from 
dictatorship to democracy through economic improvements.134 Responding to the beliefs 
in the Kennedy administration, USAID was created in 1961 when the Foreign Assistance 
Act was approved. Five years later, the Title IX amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act 
required USAID to implement economic programs that encouraged participation of 
democratic private and local government institutions in an attempted shift to more 
politically oriented assistance programs.135  
From its inception, USAID has been generally hesitant to be involved in politically 
oriented programs. The organizational culture is bent toward socioeconomic development 
rather than organizational development, though USAID has executed programs that 
promote democracy and not just development. Programs in the early years included 
supporting foreign legislatures, legal institutions, civic education, labor unions, and local 
governments. Conceived in the late 1960s and executed during the 1970s, USAID funded 
a program that strengthened the capacity of legislatures in South Korea, Brazil, Ethiopia, 
Lebanon, and Costa Rica.136 However, in Africa, the success of democracy assistance is 
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low. In a 1997 study by Bratton and Van De Wall, of the 25 cases of aid in Africa, only 
eight resulted in democratic transitions.137 
In Guatemala in the late 1960s and early 1970s, USAID programs trained leaders 
in rural communities to get involved in their own community development. As mentioned 
in the covert action section of this chapter, alongside the USAID support, the DOD and 
the CIA were actively supporting the Guatemalan military counterinsurgency campaign 
against growing guerrilla forces and organized political opposition as a part of their 
continued support to Guatemala based on the 1950s covert action program. Unfortunately, 
a 1980s study found that more than 750 of the rural leaders who participated in the 
USAID program were murdered by the Guatemalan military that the DOD and CIA had 
been backing.138 The Guatemalan experience should be an example of the importance of 
interagency planning and execution in foreign policy with regard to supporting political, 
social, and counter-government groups. 
During the 1980s under President Reagan, democracy assistance continued to be a 
core priority of U.S. foreign aid. The Reagan administration was building on the economic 
development programs from the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Carter administrations that 
had made economic development the mainstay of their democracy oriented programs. 
Some historians believe there is a direct relation between the doubling down on 
democracy assistance in the 1980s and the heightened anti-communism of the Reagan 
administration. While the anti-communist policy seemed to be rooted in military strength, 
promoting the ideology of democracy was instituted to directly counter the Soviet Union’s 
considerable investment in campaigns and programs spreading communism.139  
It was during the Reagan era that NED was approved for congressional funding to 
implement overt democracy assistance. The idea for the NED dates back to congressman 
Dante Fascell in the 1970s, and its initial budget was $18 million.140 NED is a 
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congressionally funded non-profit organization with an independent board of directors, 
management, and staff. NED was established as a government funded anti-communist 
organization whose programs were intended to counter communist ideals.141 Through four 
main grantees during the Cold War, projects dispatched experts on representative political 
parties, free market economies, independent trade unions, and a free press around the 
world to influence and engage target groups. In the post–Cold War era, NED continues its 
charter of strengthening democratic institutions and fosters democratic values in over 100 
countries.142  
USAID and NED sponsored multiple democracy assistance programs in the 1980s. 
Their election centric projects were throughout Latin America—Haiti in 1982, Guatemala 
and Honduras in 1985, Chile in 1988, Paraguay in 1989, and Nicaragua in 1990.143 Along 
with covert political action, the United States took a political approach to overt democracy 
assistance while aiding the Solidarity trade-union movement in Poland throughout the 
1980s.144 In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the NED supported human rights 
organizations, dissident publications and media, and other potential sources of influence in 
the Soviet Bloc.145 
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
As reviewed in this chapter, United States experiences in covert action and 
democracy assistance provide insights to future political warfare policies. Covert action, 
particularly political action, and democracy assistance programs provide a combination of 
options to influence people and the political outcomes of a target country. Whereas covert 
action is intended to disguise the hand of the United States, democracy assistance 
programs are overt actions that show the intention of the United States to support or 
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influence a target country or entity. As introduced in Chapter I, social movement theory 
and the results from the Chenoweth and Stephan’s study give academic based context to 
lessons learned from U.S. Cold War experience in supporting political, social, and 
counter-government groups.  
The Cold War experience and the research show that external support is necessary, 
but there are particulars to that support that can make a difference in avoiding controversy 
while still meeting national objectives. First, the chapter highlighted the importance of a 
comprehensive policy that integrates all instruments of national power to support or 
sponsor a popularly backed movement. The policy may also require consistency and a 
long-term outlook to achieve the desired objectives. Social movement theory and the 
Chenoweth and Stephan’s research indicate that popularly backed movements that remain 
non-violent and receive support from the margins have an increased chance to effect 
desired change, such as regime reform. The research also corroborates the positive and 
non-controversial aspects of covert political action and democracy assistance programs of 
the Cold War. An analysis of U.S. Cold War activities, combined with social movement 
theory concepts, show that support to political, social, and counter-government groups can 






V. ROLE OF SPECIAL WARFARE AS A SUPPORTING AND 
SYNCHRONIZING ELEMENT 
This chapter briefly examines both the specific special warfare activities of the 
Cold War and the special operations role supporting and synchronizing into a modern-day 
political warfare campaign. The examination of the special warfare activities and tools are 
shown through operations in Greece, Europe, Indochina, and Latin America. These 
operations show the policies executed at the tactical level that contributed to the larger 
strategic effort of other government agencies in United States political warfare policy.146 
As will be noted later in the chapter, many of the activities that make up political warfare 
are doctrinally special warfare activities executed by military special operations forces and 
can be executed in support of other covert or overt programs. The hypothesis guiding this 
chapter is as follows: 
Political warfare activities are integral to special warfare doctrine thereby 
effectively positioning SOF to support and synchronize political warfare 
strategies. 
Additionally, the role of special warfare in the human domain and working with 
population networks provide context to the positioning of SOF as a supporting and 
synchronizing element.  
Military operations in Greece show the implementation of foreign internal defense 
and capacity-building that became cornerstones of special warfare. Operations in Europe 
highlight an almost 40-year commitment by SOF to unconventional warfare and counter-
unconventional warfare. Counterinsurgency operations in Indochina highlight the 
evolution of special warfare tasks to meet political warfare objectives. In Latin America, 
SOF executed special warfare activities in a support role to multiple interagency political 
warfare plans providing opportunities to expand strategies into various parts of the 
population networks. Lessons learned from these operations have been applied to modern-
day SOF policy regarding interagency integration. This chapter reveals that special 
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warfare activities place SOF in a supporting role to execute political warfare policy. 
Special warfare activities within the population and networks also provide opportunities 
for other government and host nation agencies to use SOF as an integrating element with 
other covert and overt programs.  
A. BACKGROUND 
Special warfare activities of the Cold War and beyond have their roots in the 
Office of Strategic Services (OSS).147 As defined by Army Doctrine Publication 3–05, 
special warfare is 
The execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and 
nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a 
deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small 
unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat 
formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.148 
Once the OSS disbanded after WWII, it was not until 1952 that the Psychological 
Warfare Center (later named the Special Warfare Center) and its subsequent SOF units 
began their evolution from OSS to modern-day SOF.149 The special warfare activities 
SOF executed during the Cold War were in support of political warfare policies to contain, 
deter, and roll back the Soviet Union.  
As the Cold War evolved, special warfare activities also evolved. In the early years 
of the Cold War, the special warfare activities of unconventional warfare and 
psychological operations were the core tasks for SOF just as they were the core tasks for 
the OSS. Special warfare activities began to include a range of lethal and non-lethal tasks, 
such as foreign internal defense, counter-unconventional warfare, capacity building, 
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counter insurgency, and civil affairs operations.150 These special warfare tasks from the 
Cold War are still relevant and executed in the 21st century. As noted in Chapter I, most 
of these activities fall under the operational definition of political warfare as well.151  
B. SPECIAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES AND EVOLUTION 
Cold War operations in Greece, Europe, Indochina, and Latin America provide 
examples of special warfare activities and tools. Examining operations in these regions 
shows indications of political warfare policies executed at the tactical level while 
contributing to the larger strategic effort.  
1. Greece 
In the 1940s, Greece was on the verge of civil war when the Greek Communist 
Party (KKE) refused to participate in rebuilding the Greek political and social systems.152 
With support from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia’s communist leader Tito, the KKE 
was intent on bringing communist rule to Greece. In May 1947, President Truman pledged 
support to the Greek government through the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, 
declaring, “I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples 
who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”153 
At the time, the Greek armed forces were considered to be in shambles and unable to 
maintain internal security in Greece.154 Following the approval of the Marshall Plan, the 
U.S. military mission in Greece used capacity building, foreign internal defense, and 
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counter insurgency as the main tools to support and eventually rebuild the Greek armed 
forces. U.S. special operations forces did not exist at the time, but the overall U.S. military 
role was indicative of future foreign internal defense operations, which would become a 
lasting special warfare mission for SOF.  
By late October 1946, just before the United States pledged support to Greece, the 
KKE retreated to northern Greece to rebuild and refit to continue the fight against the non-
communist Greek government and armed forces. Upon retreat, the KKE formed a new 
communist-led military called the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE). The DSE was 
organized as a trained active guerilla army of 23,000 soldiers. Both the KKE and the DSE 
claimed to also have an underground support network of 50,000 people and the support of 
500,000 sympathizers throughout Greece.155  
In addition to supporting and rebuilding the official Greek Armed Forces to 
maintain security, the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group 
(JUSMAPG) mission included working within the political and governance systems to get 
the required support to the Greek armed forces. The U.S. military had to work with the 
government system to support the rebuilding of the Greek military and to execute the 
Marshall Plan aid programs.156 Over the course of the next two years, JUSMAPG advisors 
not only reorganized the Greek armed forces but also worked with them to clear DSE 
insurgents from the Greek mountains by helping design and execute offensive 
operations.157 In 1949, after a series of effective operations, the commander of the 
JUSMAPG, James Van Fleet, saw the results from his rapid and comprehensive 
reorganization of the Greek armed forces, which were thus able to execute a decisively 
aggressive campaign against the insurgents.158 While the JUSMAPG did not achieve all 
its reorganization goals, the newly organized Greek armed forces are credited with 
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ensuring Greek independence from communist control. Historian Robert Mages suggests 
the success of the JUSMAPG in Greece is largely due to the application of four principles: 
1. Work with and support elements in the indigenous armed forces and 
government that share American goals and objectives. 
2. Demand accountability and have advisor teams share the hazards and 
hardships of the force 
3. Build the indigenous army according to the requirements of the conflict. 
4. Remember that the war must be waged and won by the indigenous army 
and the government it defends.159 
The lessons learned from these principles became essential elements of special warfare 
and SOF policies and doctrine throughout the Cold War and into post–Cold War 
operations.  
2. Europe  
In the events leading up to the Cold War, the United States began its first European 
interventions in Turkey and Greece followed by subsequent support to other European 
nations through the Marshall Plan. As noted in previous chapters, the newly formed 
Central Intelligence Agency had taken the lead for preparations and activities within the 
Soviet zones of influence in Eastern and Central Europe at the beginning of the Cold War. 
Shortly thereafter, in 1952, the 10th Special Forces Group was activated at Ft. Bragg, 
North Carolina. Subsequently, it was deployed to Bad Tolz, West Germany, in preparation 
for military requirements in Europe after the East German uprising. In the fall of 1953, 
there was a sudden revolt in East Germany resulting in the violent suppression of 
protesters by Soviet tanks and armed forces.160 The newly formed 10th Special Forces 
Group remained in Europe, preparing for unconventional warfare against continued Soviet 
Union repression and expansion.  
Preparing for unconventional warfare in Europe included training a stay-behind 
network of resistance fighters and supporters in Western Europe in what would become a 
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lasting special warfare task for SOF throughout the Cold War. This network was code-
named GLADIO. The CIA and the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, or MI6) 
served as the executive agents for these stay-behind networks, recruiting, and funding 
them. However, the U.S. Special Forces and British Special Air Service (British SOF) 
trained and worked with the GLADIO networks for over 30 years. These networks were 
established in case of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. If the Soviets invaded, the 
network was to remain behind enemy lines to establish and strengthen local resistance 
movements and to sabotage the occupying forces. Though NATO headquarters controlled 
the networks, the responsibility for training and operations of forces in different countries 
was split between the United States and Britain. The training and development of the 
GLADIO network exercised basic special warfare activities as well as interagency and 
intergovernmental support and integration.161  
3. Indochina 
The United States initiated special warfare activities in Indochina in the late 1950s 
with support to French and CIA operations. The nearly 15-year involvement in Vietnam, 
Laos, and Cambodia would for many years be the defining times for special warfare 
during the Cold War. SOF was left to wither away after Vietnam but would be revitalized 
in the 1980s after a series of terrorist activities and legislation changes.162 Many of the 
lessons learned from special warfare core tasks in the Indochina region contributed to the 
interagency integration and planning that is still used in 21st century SOF operations. One 
of those lessons is that conventional military methods do not work in a conflict that is as 
much about politics and governance as it is about military strength and capability.163  
Initially, the CIA had responsibility for unconventional warfare activities in Laos 
and Vietnam. SOF was also in Laos during project White Star in 1959. Project White Star 
became a joint DOD-CIA project to enable the Laotian army to counter insurgent 
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activities by Laos guerrillas supported by North Vietnam.164 In Vietnam, SOF, which 
would eventually have 26 teams executing the program, was primarily responsible for the 
Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program planned and funded by the CIA. The 
program focused on the development of village defense forces and district-level response 
units. The program was also assisted by USAID to support numerous civil affairs 
programs to include supplying basic medical aid.165  
Vietnam also introduced the new mission of counterinsurgency.166 At President 
Kennedy’s behest, Cold War policy reoriented toward “wars of national liberation” and 
assistance for friendly governments countering insurgencies.167 SOF became the 
instrument to implement counter-insurgency and what some would call counter-
unconventional warfare. In supporting this effort, military psychological operations in 
Vietnam were operating alongside 10 U.S. agencies that were actively participating in 
psychological operations and associated programs.168 In the end, the SOF role in Vietnam 
diverged from traditional special warfare to more conventional reconnaissance and search 
and destroy missions, which degraded special warfare use and capabilities during this 
period.  
4. Latin America 
Special operations forces have long been engaged in Latin America with various 
missions, from support to CIA-led covert political action and unconventional warfare to 
foreign internal defense and capacity building. In Honduras and El Salvador, special 
operations had a prominent role in counter-insurgency assistance. Through a CIA-led 
program, special warfare units supported the anti-Sandinista rebels in Nicaragua and were 
active in Grenada and Panama.169 In Bolivia, the SOF mobile training team deployed in 
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1967 and began operations with the Bolivian Rangers against Che Guevara’s insurgents. 
In October 1967, Che Guevara was caught in what may be described as a classic example 
of foreign internal defense.170 In his 2004 doctoral dissertation, Hy Rothstein attributes the 
adoption of democratic forms of government in almost every Latin American country to 
over 50 years of involvement in special operations support to the military elite in those 
countries.171 Democratic reform, capacity building, and security sector reform were all 
end goals of U.S. political warfare policies during the Cold War. 
5. Case Summary 
For over 30 years during the Cold War, SOF regularly executed missions 
supporting irregular and insurgent forces such as the Mujahidin in Afghanistan and the 
anti-government resistance movements in Angola and Cambodia.172 In the Pacific theater, 
special warfare units were training forces in South Korea, Philippines, Laos, Indonesia, 
Thailand, and elsewhere.173 In each location, as well as the specific areas discussed 
previously, training and capacity building were at the root of the mission. Globally, the 
special warfare activities were always in support of the Cold War political warfare 
strategy. As the policies changed to meet goals to support, stabilize or even de-stabilize 
governments, special warfare activities were intended to reach Cold War objectives to 
contain and rollback the Soviet Union.  
C. SUPPORT TO AND INTEGRATION WITH THE INTERAGENCY 
During the Cold War, special warfare missions were linked to the anti-Soviet 
strategic policy and often worked in support of CIA-led efforts or alongside USAID and 
DoS in places like Vietnam and in Latin America. By definition, special warfare places 
SOF among the population, working alongside them in various lethal and non-lethal 
activities. Among other things, working amid the population enables SOF to identify 
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population characteristics and assess various criteria for support and programs. The 
capability to identify and assess becomes especially useful in scenarios in which decision 
makers and the interagency want to apply the criteria and characteristics identified in 
social movement theory, as referenced in Chapter I. Generally, the ability to work among 
the population not only informs but also leads to identifying networks and groups that 
require support—or can be influenced and leveraged by other interagency programs.  
The 2013 U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) strategic vision 
had six priorities and optimizing partnerships with the interagency was at the top.174 The 
USASOC vision also explained that the “temperament, education, and training of SOF 
personnel drive[s] them to seek and combine the expertise resident across SOF, U.S. 
government agencies, nongovernment organizations, academia, and think tanks.”175 
Additionally, a 2015 white paper by USASOC describes SOF, and Army special operators 
in particular, as proven integrators of “indigenous forces, local populations, joint force 
components, U.S. agencies, and coalition partners.”176 USASOC suggests that the 
activities inherent in political warfare rely on the “synchronized and evolving combination 
of capabilities possessed, enabled or supported by SOF,” enabling SOF to be the 
connective tissue and synchronizing element for the interagency in political warfare.177 
The SOF acceptance of the military’s role within the interagency is possibly a lesson 
learned from the Cold War when, as James Jay Carafano and Paul Rosenzweig point out, 
the military as a whole attempted to avoid integrated interagency operations while also 
ignoring the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on the battlefield.178 
The breadth and depth of SOF around the world serves as a capability to be 
leveraged to integrate interagency political warfare policies and objectives on the ground. 
As recently as March 2016, then Special Operations Commander, General Joseph Votel 
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acknowledged that more than 10,000 special operations forces are deployed in nearly 80 
countries to support and integrate with the capabilities of conventional, international, and 
interagency partners.179 In discussions on political warfare and gray-zone challenges, SOF 
leadership recognizes that DOD is not the agency that should be leading in the interagency 
in political warfare.180 However, many of the activities that comprise political warfare 
have been cultivated and refined by SOF over the last six decades and should be 
implemented as a tool for supporting and, most importantly, integrating contemporary 
political warfare strategies. In 2015 a U.S. interdepartmental committee drafting political 
warfare policy recognized that special warfare is a leading activity for implementing 
political warfare policy and has a role integrating both covert and overt interagency 
activities programs.181  
As special operations leaders define it, political warfare falls within the so-called 
“gray zone” between war and peace yet fights for influence and dominance within a 
population. Special warfare activities, as executed by SOF, overlap with many of the 
political warfare activities that are required to identify, leverage, and influence a 
population. The sheer size and number of special operations forces deployed around the 
world working among the population in support of national security objectives also makes 
them the logical element to integrate political warfare programs within the targeted 
population.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Often, the literature on military actions during the Cold War disregard special 
warfare as part of political warfare and instead focus on nuclear and ballistic missile 
options or conventional military deterrence. Military involvement in political warfare is 
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more than those things; it is also about networks, the population, stability, and reform. The 
use of the military, and specifically SOF, provides options and signals the intent and 
resolve of the United States. Special warfare provides an opportunity to assert military 
strength and capability without escalation to a more traditional form of warfare. Special 
operations leaders agree that SOF’s proficiency in special warfare in “low-visibility, 
small-footprint, and politically sensitive operations” within a target population provides 
options for the United States to execute political warfare.182  
Special warfare and political warfare reside in the gray zone between politics and 
military conflict and between war and peace. Both require coercive measures of military 
strength while employing other means for influencing and engaging a population. Special 
warfare is an integral part of any political warfare strategy and doctrinally many of its 
activities fall under the political warfare definition. The special operations forces that 
execute special warfare are thus positioned and have the capacity to support and 
synchronize interagency political warfare activities within the target population.  
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Despite supposed reforms after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has shown 
an increased preference for political warfare as a means to advance its foreign policy and 
remain a dominant player on the world stage. Russia’s pretense to protect ethnic Russians 
abroad has allowed it to execute political warfare policies with minimal rebuke from other 
nations, such as the United States. Continued influence in the political and social fabric of 
other nations coupled with strategic influence programs ensures countries within the near-
abroad remain in the Russian “zone of privileged interests.”183 The 2014 Russian 
intervention in Ukraine was a manifestation of policies to use mostly non-military means 
to meet political objectives  
On the other hand, U.S. policy and actions have not adequately responded to the 
contemporary Russian political warfare threat and have disregarded the lessons of U.S. 
political warfare successes of the Cold War. U.S. Cold War deterrence and containment 
policies included political warfare activities in three broad categories: strategic influence; 
support to political, social, and counter-government groups; and special warfare. Neither 
the current policies of the United States nor research on deterrence and containment reflect 
the political warfare aspects of Cold War policy that can inform a contemporary strategy 
for countering Russian political warfare. 
The research question for this thesis was as follows: 
What combination of programs, concepts, and tools from Cold War 
political warfare-based activities and policies best advances U.S. strategy to 
counter Russian political warfare in the 21st century?  
To answer the research question, three hypotheses were proposed and explored. The 
hypotheses were as follows: 
1. Strategic influence operations that justify a nation’s actions and explain its 
beliefs while delegitimizing the aggressor’s narrative are critical to 
successful political warfare campaigns.  
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2. Support of political, social, and counter-government groups to undermine 
Russian political warfare and exploit vulnerabilities in target societies may 
play a key role in current deterrence and containment policies. 
3. Political warfare activities are integral to special warfare doctrine thereby 
effectively positioning SOF to support and synchronize political warfare 
strategies. 
The hypotheses provided a framework for exploring Cold War deterrence and 
containment policies in the context of political warfare. To answer the research question, 
the remainder of this chapter analyzes the validity of each hypothesis while considering 
elements of social movement theory. The thesis concludes with recommendations for a 
U.S. strategy to counter Russian political warfare.  
A. HYPOTHESIS 1—STRATEGIC INFLUENCE 
Although the role of strategic influence seemed to oscillate from one 
administration to the next, it was the changes in, and the eventual balance between, the 
mode and aggressiveness of the U.S. narrative that seemed to have the most strategic 
influence effects on the outcome of the Cold War most. During the Ice Age referenced in 
Chapter III, some policymakers viewed strategic influence as less important compared to 
other aspects of political warfare. However, the balanced narratives of the strategic 
influence programs before and after the Ice Age may have contributed most to the 
changing mindsets of the Soviet leadership, which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Regarding the aggressiveness of the narrative, U.S. policymakers and society alike seemed 
to prefer the strategies of the full and fair information approaches to others. From the 
perspective of the American public and policymakers, cultural infiltration to influence 
lasting changes in the foreign audience seemed to be more acceptable and reflective of 
American values. Campaign of Truth-style strategies, which assertively delegitimized the 
Soviet Union, were often compared to the aggressive and nasty messaging of Soviet 
strategic-influence methods, which were considered distasteful to the American public and 
policymakers.  
The first hypothesis is validated with a caveat regarding emphasis of the two 
narratives. As shown in Chapter III, programs that resonated and seemed to have lasting 
 59
effects were those that exposed the target population to different aspects of the U.S. 
system, culture, and ideals. The caveat to the hypothesis is that a balance must be achieved 
when delegitimizing the aggressor nation’s narrative. The Soviet’s manipulated the 
Campaign of Truth narrative, pointing to it as an indication of U.S. defensiveness about 
democracy and Western ideals. Additionally, the results and abrupt cancellation of 
programs like the Campaign of Truth show that decision makers and the public must be 
whole-heartedly behind any aggressive messaging; otherwise, the messaging may be 
called to a halt. Research on U.S. strategic influence during the Cold War shows that 
programs focused on making long-term changes in society may have more influence and 
staying power than overly aggressive messaging strategies that show the faults of the 
opponent.  
Emphasizing the right narrative is crucial to developing a strategic influence 
program to counter Russia in the 21st century. The narrative and strategy should have a 
long-term outlook while focusing on the benefits of U.S. and Western ideals. Directly 
countering and delegitimizing Russia’s narrative has a role but it should not be the 
strategy’s main emphasis. Lessons from the Cold War show that policymakers and society 
may have a low threshold of tolerance for overemphasizing a narrative. Most importantly, 
an aggressive delegitimizing narrative is not necessarily effective and may not meet the 
desired strategic influence objective.  
B. HYPOTHESIS 2—SUPPORT TO POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND COUNTER-
GOVERNMENT GROUPS 
Covert and overt support to political, social, and counter-government groups was a 
consistent tool used by all administrations during the Cold War. Political action programs 
in Italy, Japan, the Philippines, and Latin America were longstanding programs that 
supported a combination of all three. Overt democracy assistance focused on the concepts 
of stabilizing governments and educating groups on democratic ideals and governance 
options. Combined, overt and covert support to various groups was a means for the United 
States both to counter Soviet support and to influence nations that may have been 
susceptible to communism.  
 60
Social movement theory, referenced in Chapter I, offers insight into which groups 
should receive support and how best to support them. The factors outlined by researcher 
Doowan Lee regarding the political and societal conditions necessary for a movement to 
progress are specific about conditions to consider. The nation who contemplates support 
should recognize and contemplate the noted strengths, capabilities, and makeup of an 
organization. The results from Chenoweth and Stephan’s research challenges the notion of 
when a group should be supported and whether or not that support should be geared 
toward military or non-military support.  
The aforementioned lessons from the Cold War complement research in social 
movement theory. After operation TPAJAX in Iran, CIA operative Kermit Roosevelt 
expressed that the success of the operation was due to the movement already having 
public support and key characteristics that supported its path to success.184 For some 
programs, military-centric strength and capabilities appeared to be the deciding factor on 
which group the United States supported. However, the focus of assessment before 
determining support to a group should center on actual public support and governance 
capabilities. Social movement theory and lessons from the Cold War suggest that if the 
United States were to support a group, the capabilities and organizational makeup of the 
group, combined with internal political and societal conditions, must be in U.S. favor.  
Findings from Chapter IV suggest that for the contemporary tensions between 
Russia and the United States, the United States should continue to support political, social, 
and counter-government groups. Though research validates the hypothesis, there is one 
significant consideration regarding the selection of which group to support and when. 
Thus, while support to various groups should be a tool in a contemporary strategy against 
Russia, the considerations of public support, organizational characteristics, and external 
societal conditions should play a major role in the final decision to support. 
                                                 
184 Daugherty, Executive Secrets, 138.  
 61
C. HYPOTHESIS 3—SPECIAL WARFARE AS A SUPPORTING AND 
SYNCHRONIZING FUNCTION  
U.S. special operations forces executed special warfare in support of political 
warfare strategies to meet deterrence and containment objectives during the Cold War. 
The tasks ranged from foreign internal defense throughout Latin America to preparation 
for unconventional warfare in Europe. In Indochina, the original special warfare tasks 
dating back to the OSS were expanded to include counter-insurgency. Special operations 
forces played key roles in the region, integrating counterinsurgency with covert 
paramilitary operations and overt capacity-building programs. Special warfare placed 
special operations forces in direct contact with populations the United States was intent on 
influencing, leveraging, or exploiting using political warfare.  
In the post–Cold War era, special operations forces and special warfare activities 
have, almost by default, evolved into a natural integrating element across the interagency 
and host nation governments. As noted in Chapter V, nearly 10,000 U.S. special 
operations forces are deployed in over 80 countries around the world.185 They are 
executing special warfare tasks, such as foreign internal defense and capacity building, 
while developing relationships and partnerships with key influencers both internal and 
external to the U.S. government. Special warfare activities are centered on developing 
relationships with the population, and those relationships can often be expanded to support 
the objectives of political warfare. The special warfare experience and the requirement to 
work with the population as well as support other instruments of national power make 
special warfare a supporting and synchronizing function in political warfare to counter 
Russia in the 21st century.  
Experience in the Cold War shows that special operations and the execution of 
special warfare can meet objectives of influencing the population as well as serving as an 
integrating element. Additionally, special operations forces and special warfare activities 
serve as a signal to U.S. allies—and Russia—of the U.S. commitment toward its 
objectives. The use of special operations is also a subtle demonstration of military strength 
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and capability. The hypothesis regarding the tool of special warfare as a supporting and 
integrating element is valid. Special warfare activities and special operations have proven 
capable of supporting and connecting population networks with the interagency and 
overall U.S. political warfare strategy.  
D. THE COMMON THEME 
While not part of the original hypotheses, the common theme found throughout the 
research was that each U.S. administration appears to have had a comprehensive policy 
and strategy to deter, contain, and rollback the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In the 
early years, directives and strategies such as NSC 10/2, NSC 68, and NSC 5501 directly 
acknowledged the Soviet threat and provided guidance and authorization to counter or 
deter the threat. During the Reagan era, NSDD 32 and NSDD 54 soon thereafter 
reenergized the U.S. strategy against the Soviet Union, authorizing a broad range of covert 
operations with complementary overt economic and diplomatic programs to undermine 
Soviet policy objectives.186  
Today’s unclassified and publicly available policies toward countering Russia 
neither include all instruments of national power nor provide clear, decisive guidance.187 
Even if there are classified covert policies for covert action or military programs, there 
should be an unclassified overt policy that fully acknowledges Russia’s intent, objectives, 
and actions as a prerequisite for developing a clear comprehensive strategy to meet U.S. 
objectives and thwart Russia’s goals. U.S. objectives must be clearly defined; otherwise, 
there is no endstate to work toward. A comprehensive policy on Russia should be a part of 
a larger policy against all U.S. adversaries.  
The 2015 political warfare policy drafted by an interdepartmental committee 
provides a first step toward ensuring all instruments of national power are included in a 
response to a non-military centric threat. While the policy discusses all countries that pose 
a political warfare threat—namely Russia, China, and Iran—it is mainly focused on 
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providing guidance for U.S. political warfare.188 The stated objective in the political 
warfare draft policy is as follows: 
[to] isolate, erode, manipulate, exhaust, wear down, attrite, overthrow, 
reduce, replace, or create the conditions to coerce a belligerent government 
or regime to acquiesce to our national objectives, without going to war.189 
The policy outlines how the United States would use all instruments of national power in a 
combination of overt and covert actions. The actions outlined include the activities 
discussed in this thesis as well as other diplomatic and economic measures.  
The draft policy is clear regarding the roles of each instrument of national power 
though it arguably lacks expanded guidance to implement these actions in a coordinated 
manner over time. In theory, the coordinating function assigned to the Department of State 
and the NSC Board for Low Intensity Conflict would ensure specific guidance and 
integration for all political warfare activities. The coordination and integration of all 
political warfare activities is important to ensure that programs do not overlap or counter 
each other. The coordinating element must also be empowered to do its job. The 
operations coordinating board and psychological strategy board of the Eisenhower and 
Truman administrations, respectively, were supposed to coordinate policy and strategic 
influence programs, but neither appeared to achieve the level of coordination and planning 
desired. In the end, a clear comprehensive strategy that acknowledges the threat and 
provides guidance to meet defined objectives must be applied against Russia. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Russia in the 21st century is continuing a policy of political warfare while the 
United States appears to be executing a policy focused on deterring Russian conventional 
military actions. While Russia remains weak relative to the United States, it does share the 
Soviet Union’s willingness to use its assets for political warfare.190 The United States 
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must look back to the Cold War to use all available levers and options for political warfare 
in the 21st century.  
As both Kennan and Gaddis noted, a non-military threat cannot be countered 
solely by a military strategy. Research for this thesis showed that concepts and policies, 
such as strategic influence; support to political, social and counter-government groups; 
and special warfare, were integral elements of deterrence and containment policies of the 
Cold War. A comprehensive 21st century policy strategy is necessary to advance U.S. 
interests and undermine those of our enemy.  
It would be advantageous to take into account U.S. Cold War political warfare 
experience in a contemporary policy toward Russia. The policy should include strategic 
influence concepts and programs similar to the full and fair and cultural infiltration 
approaches as they have been linked to long-term changes in individual belief systems 
toward the United States. Just as Russia continues its support to political, social, and 
counter-government groups, so should the United States. Cold War lessons of supporting 
groups already enjoying public support combined with characteristics outlined in social 
movement theory should be included in the decision process. SOF and special warfare 
provide an opportunity for the United States to apply a military tool in a non-conventional 
manner as an integrating element in political warfare. The United States has the requisite 
experience in political warfare to deter and contain a threat such as Russia. It should 
unveil a comprehensive political warfare policy that applies U.S. experience toward a 
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